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Paulsen: A RFRA Runs Through It

A RFRA RUNS THROUGH IT: RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND THE U.S. CODE
Michael Stokes Paulsen"
I. INTRODUCTION

Whether Democrats or Republicans are in power, Government (with a big G) has an irrepressible institutional bias
against religious freedom claims. This is especially true where
the religious claimant seeks an exemption or accommodation
from usual government rules because of the unique conflict those
rules present for that individual's (or group's) exercise of religion.
Such free exercise claims are, to institutional Government,
an annoyance. They require Government to do something different, perhaps even inconvenient. They are not always costless.
They present, to bureaucrats, inevitable slippery slopes that
threaten the programs they administer: what if everybody wanted an exemption? The slope is assumed to be a steep, near-vertical cliff: everyone will concoct a religious belief entitling them to
exemption if we make the mistake of granting that first, precedent-setting accommodation. 1 Religious freedom claims thus
require Government to sort out bona fide free exercise of religion
claims from false ones of simple resistance to bureaucracy-and
to do so without violating other constitutional principles forbidding Government discrimination among religious beliefs or Government evaluation of the truth, worth, consistency, or plausibility of asserted religious beliefs.2 This latter task is certainly not

t
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should be warned that I was counsel for a coalition of amici religious organizations
supporting Crystal Evangelical Free Church in the case of Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, which is discussed at length in this article. The views expressed here are my own.
My thanks to Dean Rodney Smith and the members of the Montana Law
Review for their hospitality in putting together this symposium. My thanks to the
symposium participants and to Tom Berg, for helpful comments on the draft version
of this paper, and to Marguerite Spencer and Richard Murphy for research assistance.
1.
Chip Lupu has put it well: "Behind every free exercise claim is a spectral
march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, and you will be confronted
with an endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every stripe.'
Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989).
2. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 695 (1989); Thomas v. Re-
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easy or costless.
Far better then, the bureaucratic thinking goes, simply to
reject all such claims. Thus, even before Employment Division v.
Smith,3 the U.S. Department of Justice urged abandonment of
the "compelling interest" standard of Sherbert v. Verner and
subsequent cases as the test of when Government must grant
religion-specific exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment.4 Even where the Department did not
forthrightly urge overturning the compelling interest test, it argued that the Government had a compelling interest in virtually
every imaginable application of a federal statute, regulation, or
policy (or that a given area should be wholly exempt from the
compelling interest standard).5
One would have thought that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,6 affectionately known to its supporters as
"RFRA" (pronounced "riffra"), would have changed all that. The
compelling interest test had always been a somewhat tendentious inference (though I think a proper one) from the lean language of the Free Exercise Clause.7 But in the wake of the test's
view Board, 450 U.S. 707, 714-16 (1981); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 8788 (1944).
3.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) was the genesis of the compelling
interest test in the Free Exercise Clause context, though the doctrinal formula-and
the precise words of legal jargon that RFRA sought to recapture as a matter of statutory law--did not reach full bloom until Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981). The compelling interest test of Sherbert and subsequent cases requires (i) that
any government-created burden; on (ii) the claimant's exercise of sincerely-held religious beliefs; may be justified only by (iii) a compelling governmental interest; (iv)
accomplished by the least-restrictive means reasonably available. RFRA adopts this
approach virtually verbatim. See infra text accompanying notes 80-104.
5. See, for example, the United States Government's position in the cases of
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503 (1986); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290
(1985); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Unites States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252 (1982) and in its amicus brief in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987). Many of these cases are discussed infra.
6.
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488-89; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
7. Professor Stephen Pepper has persuasively shown how the text of the Free
Exercise Clause is fairly capable of conflicting interpretations on the issue of religionspecific exemptions from facially neutral laws. Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 299. I am persuaded by Professor Pepper's
analysis that the text of the Free Exercise Clause certainly permits the Sherbert
reading. Indeed, I believe that the arguments he makes establish the Sherbert reading as the better one, unless one's analysis is driven by the sort of slippery-slope
fears that animate Government's hostility to this reading. However, I would concede
that the question is not free from doubt, as a textual matter.
Professor Michael McConnell has made a powerful historical case for the con-
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repudiation (for the most part)' in Employment Division v.
Smith, RFRA makes application of that test the explicit textual
command of a sweeping, breathtaking new federal civil rights
statute. One may not like the compelling interest test, but there
it is in black and white:
[Section 2(b).1 The purposes of this Act are (1) to restore
the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free
exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide
a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.
[Section 3(a) & (b). Government shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability, except [where] ... it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 9
RFRA presents a number of difficult and important legal
issues. Much early discussion has focused on the controversial
question of RFRA's constitutionality as applied to trump laws
enacted by state governments: What gives Congress power to

clusion that the original understanding of the Free Exercise Clause was that the
clause would sometimes require exemptions from facially neutral and otherwise generally applicable requirements of law, and that the compelling interest standard (or,
at least, a compelling interest standard with real bite to the word "compelling") is a
fairly good present-day approximation of the level of justification that the founding
generation perceived would be necessary in order for the government to prevail in
the face of a conflict with bona fide religious exercise. Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1409 (1990). In my view, Professor McConnell's historical research clearly demonstrates that any textual ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the Sherbert proexemptions/compelling interest reading of the clause, and against the Smith reading.
8. Smith technically left some "exceptions" to its new rule that the Free Exercise Clause affords no relief from the effects of generally applicable, facially neutral
statutes, but nearly everybody agrees (friends and foes of Smith alike) that those
exceptions are unprincipled or nonsensical and cannot be squared with the basic
thrust of Smith. See generally Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants
of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and
Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 & n.3 (1991) (noting that
Smith's "use of precedent borders on fiction" and citing as examples the Court's preserved exceptions to its new rule).
9. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b), § 3(a) & (b), 107 Stat. 1488-89; 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb(b), § 2000bb-l(a) & (b) (Supp. V 1993).
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regulate the states qua states with a national religious freedom
statute that adopts a legal test rejected by the Supreme Court as
a matter of constitutional law? This is an important (and not
particularly easy) question of congressional power under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to change the content of constitutional law enforced by the courts. The issue already has been
addressed by others (including some participants in this symposium). °
10. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39 (1995)
(arguing that RFRA exceeds Congress' constitutional power to enact, given Smith, but
that Smith was wrongly decided); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's
Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171 (1995) (arguing that RFRA should be given a narrowing construction to reduce constitutional difficulties).
Douglas Laycock has presented a strong argument for RFRA's validity as an
exercise of congressional enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, under current case law interpreting Section 5 and the analogous enforcement sections of the Fifteenth Amendment. Douglas Laycock, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 245-54 (1993); see also Douglas
Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145 (1995). The problem is that that case law is not itself persuasive and that its unpersuasiveness is
highlighted by RFRA: how can Congress be "enforc[ing]" Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment (the section that 'incorporates" the Free Exercise Clause) if the Supreme
Court has held that Section 1 is not violated by the action that Congress seeks to
prohibit?
The answer, I believe, requires a new theoretical defense of "the Morgan power" (named for the case of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)). Such a defense would be based on notions of the indeterminacy of legal language and the
proper judicial role when confronted with indeterminate constitutional language: If
the broad language of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment admits of more than
one legitimate interpretation, and Congress has acted pursuant to one of them, then
the Court, because it cannot say that Congress' action was outside the bounds of
legitimate congressional choice, cannot declare the act unconstitutional, even though
the Court's (necessarily provisional) initial interpretation of the provision in question,
made in the absence of congressional action, was to the contrary. In form, congressional power to overrule the Court's default interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment is similar to congressional power to overrule the Court's default interpretations
of the Commerce Clause, as it has been thought to limit states' power to regulate
commerce.
Thus, if the Free Exercise Clause (incorporated as one of the substantive privileges or immunities of citizens protected by the Fourteenth Amendment) is fairly
subject to one of two constructions, the pre-Smith view and the Smith view-a proposition apparently supported by Smith itself, 494 U.S. at 878-Congress necessarily
has constitutional power to "enforce" the former understanding. This theory has two
surprising implications: First, it provides the most plausible defense of the otherwise
unsupportable holding in Smith itself (and thus may offer the justices adhering to
Smith a face-saving way of affirming the propriety of both Smith and RFRA). Second, it implies that Congress has the power to lessen the enforcement of what it
deems "over-enforced" constitutional norms, where the indeterminate constitutional
language interpreted by the Supreme Court is susceptible of more than one legitimate interpretation, and the Court has adopted the less "restrained" reading (e.g.,
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While there is more that needs to be said about the Section
5 power issue, I would like to set that problem to one side for the
moment. I would like to address a different, hopefully easier, but
no less important aspect of RFRA: the applicability of RFRA to
trump laws enacted by the federal government.
There is no question of constitutional power here. Congress
possesses the same power to pass RFRA, as RFRA concerns
federal statutes, as it had to pass those other federal statutes in
the first place. If Congress had power to pass a statute to begin
with, Congress has power to modify it by enacting RFRA. 1'
And what an extraordinary modification of governmental
power it is! RFRA operates as a sweeping "super-statute," cutting across all other federal statutes (now and future, unless
specifically exempted) and modifying their reach. RFRA qualifies
Congress' regulations of commerce, of defense, of the post office,
of immigration, of bankruptcy, of federal lands, and so on. When-

the reverse of the Smith situation). I hope to develop this thesis in greater detail in
a .subsequent article.
11.
In her contribution to this symposium, Professor Joanne Brant offers the
surprising argument that RFRA is unconstitutional because it directs the Court to do
what it purportedly said in Smith it was beyond judicial competence to do: apply a
"compelling interest' standard in free exercise cases. According to Brant, RFRA therefore violates fundamental separation of powers principles. Joanne C. Brant, Taking
the Supreme Court at its Word: The Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5 (1995).
With respect, I believe that Brant's theory is predicated on a severe over-reading of Smith on the "judicial competence" point. Smith is better read as a (purported) exercise of judicial restraint. The Court retreated from the compelling interest
test because it felt that it was improper for the judiciary to create such a test. That
does not mean that it would be unconstitutional for the test to be enacted by statute, as the Court itself seemed to concede: "[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that
it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasion for its creation can
be discerned by the courts." Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
That Professor Brant's argument is an overreading of Smith is confirmed by
the fact that Smith explicitly reaffirmed the validity of the Sherbert and Yoder cases-both of which applied the compelling interest test. Moreover, the test was applied the very Term after Smith, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). If Smith rejected the compelling interest test on
the ground that courts are, as a matter of constitutional law, incompetent to apply
such a test, then why did the Court leave intact its prior decisions in Sherbert and
Yoder and how could it have applied that test the next Term in Lukumi? Smith
merely narrowed the range of the compelling interest test's applicability; it did not
hold the test "unconstitutional." In RFRA, Congress has done what many other such
statutes have done: adopted a statutory standard for judicial application in cases of a
certain description. RFRA employs a standard based on judicial decisions that the
Court has since rejected, but this does not meaningfully distinguish RFRA from any
of countless statutes where Congress has "restored" a legal test abandoned by the
Court.
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ever federal law, or the implementation of federal law,12 substantially burdens religious exercise, the federal government
must show that such burden is justified by a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of accomplishing that interest."3 RFRA supersedes all prior federal law inconsistent with its requirements." RFRA also trumps all subsequently enacted federal law, unless such laws explicitly exclude
application of RFRA.15
RFRA is thus a powerful current running through the entire
landscape of the U.S. Code. My thesis in this Article concerns
the force of RFRA's current, and the depth of the channel it cuts,
through federal law-the meaning of the "compelling interest"
test as adopted by RFRA and as applied to free exercise claims
against the federal government. I do not here purport to offer a
comprehensive theory of the meaning of the term "compelling
governmental interest." Rather, I wish to offer just three modest
points about the meaning of the compelling interest standard,
directed primarily at what that test does not-and cannot-mean.
First, a Government policy goal cannot properly be considered "compelling" (within the meaning of RFRA) where that goal
is not pursued uniformly with respect to all, or very nearly all,
analogous situations of nonreligious private conduct in which the
goal is implicated. If Government pursues a goal selectively or
partially, that goal is not so unqualifiedly compelling as to override a RFRA claim of religious exemption. If the goal is subordinated to other policy interests, it must be subordinated to the
free exercise of religion as well.
Second, and perhaps most importantly (and, one would
think, most obviously), a Government policy interest is not "compelling" within the meaning of RFRA just because Government
says it is. That would permit institutional Government to opt out
of RFRA at will. Nonetheless, this was frequently the substance
of the Government's position in pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause
cases. The federal government often asserted a "compelling state
interest" simply by virtue of the fact that Congress had passed a
statute on the subject or that a particular executive branch regulation or policy was ostensibly in furtherance of, or implemented,
12. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a), 107 Stat.
(Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
13. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(b), 107 Stat. at
14. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a), 107 Stat. at
15. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(b), 107 Stat. at
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some statutory policy. Whatever the legitimacy of this gambit in
Free Exercise Clause adjudication, it plainly has no place under
RFRA. RFRA, by its own terms, cuts across and trumps other
federal statutes and regulations. 6 Moreover, RFRA specifies a
mechanism whereby Congress may exempt some federal law or
policy from RFRA's protections in the future-a mechanism, in
short, for specifying that a particular interest is sufficiently compelling to override claims of religious exemption. A necessary
implication, I submit, is that if Congress has not exempted some
category of federal law from RFRA, the Government should not
be heard to argue that its interest is compelling merely by virtue
of the fact that it is embodied in a congressional statute or faithfully implements the policies of that statute. Whatever else "compelling state interest" might mean-whatever the outer boundaries of free exercise exemption under RFRA-it cannot mean
that a given policy interest is per se "compelling" exactly to the
extent pursued by some other federal statute and should consequently prevail over claims of religious exemption. One can no
longer look to such statutes in isolation, for RFRA qualifies the
7
entire U.S. Code.
My third modest point is a specific instance of the second:
Government-except perhaps in the most exceptional situations-does not have a compelling interest in bureaucratic convenience or ease of administration. In particular, Government does
not have a compelling interest in avoiding the costs of evaluating
the sincerity of claims for religious exemption. RFRA necessarily
rejects this position, simply by virtue of its enactment. RFRA requires Government accommodation of religion. In doing so, its
standard compels an evaluation of burdens on religious exercise.
It would be nonsensical for Government to then claim a compelling interest in avoidance of the bureaucratic or administrative
costs of complying with the statute's accommodation mandate.
These three propositions might strike the casual observer as
fairly obvious-perhaps so obvious as to border on the trivial. It
might seem strange to think that Government might make the
contrary arguments at all. But those familiar with the
ratcheting-down of the compellingness of "compelling" interests
in Free Exercise Clause cases prior to Smith are familiar with

16.
Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a).
17.
Likewise, the Government should not be permitted to argue that the balance struck by Congress or by executive branch bureaucrats is necessarily the "least
restrictive means" of accomplishing a compelling interest simply because that is how
Congress struck the balance.
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the Government's (especially the federal government's) proclivity
to assert a "compelling" interest in statutory arrangements that
are not themselves consistent in their pursuit of that interest; in
its proclivity to assert that an interest is compelling simply because it is reflected in Congress' enactment of a statute within
its constitutional powers to enact; and in its proclivity to find
considerations of mere administrative convenience "compelling"
interests of the highest order. Moreover, courts often bought the
Government line: the late pre-Smith cases reflected broad judicial deference to governmental assertions of compelling interest,
carving out huge areas of quasi-exemption from the (then) constitutional protections of the Free Exercise Clause."
RFRA, I submit, does change all that. RFRA does not "codify" the late pre-Smith approach and is, in legal effect, far more
than a mere restoration of pre-Smith case law. It is a restoration
of the high-water mark of free exercise accommodation, established by the cases of Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v.
Yoder-cases specifically embraced in RFRA's "purposes" section. 9 Moreover, given the super-statute provisions of section 6,
a failure to exempt a certain class of federal statutes or regulations from the "compelling governmental interest" test of RFRA
is tantamount to congressional self-denial of the compellingness
of the federal government's interests in that context. The mere
fact that Congress has passed a law on the subject or struck a
balance in a particular way, or that it would be easier for federal
bureaucrats to administer the law without taking into account
the need to accommodate religious exercise on a case-by-case
basis, does not qualify as a compelling interest-even if it did
before, under pre-Smith, pre-RFRA case law interpreting the
Free Exercise Clause. In short, under RFRA, the arguments of
the federal government, and the reasoning of the courts in accepting those arguments, in cases such as United States v.
Lee,2" Goldman v. Weinberger," Bowen v. Roy,22 and
Hernandez v. Commissioner23-all cases involving Free Exercise
Clause claims for exemption from some requirement of federal
law-are not "good law" as they concern the meaning of the term
"compelling governmental interest" in RFRA.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra notes 20-23.
Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b), 107 Stat. at 1488; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).
455 U.S. 252 (1982).
475 U.S. 503 (1986).
476 U.S. 693 (1986).
490 U.S. 680 (1989).
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Try telling that to the Justice Department. In a case currently pending before the Eighth Circuit, Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, the federal government made its first
abortive foray into the issues of interpretation presented by
RFRA. Crystal Evangelical is the first case at the federal appellate level to raise issues of RFRA's interpretation as RFRA affects another federal statute. Barely skipping a beat from its preRFRA positions, the Department once again came down against
a religious freedom claimant. I will use Crystal Evangelical as
my vehicle for introducing the discussion of how RFRA cuts
across and alters the landscape of other federal statutes, and to
use the Justice Department's horrendous brief as a foil for my
three observations about "compelling interest" under
RFRA-each of which the Justice Department's brief explicitly or
implicitly controverts.
In an extraordinary move on the eve of oral argument in
Crystal Evangelical (just two weeks before this symposium), the
Department of Justice was overruled by President Clinton himself, who (according to press reports) believed that the
Department's brief took a narrower view of RFRA than Clinton
himself thought appropriate when he signed RFRA into law in
November of 1993. In a one-sentence letter faxed to the Eighth
Circuit, the Department of Justice announced that it was
withdrawing its brief in intervention in the Crystal Evangelical
case. The lawsuit between the parties, of course, continues to go
forward. But the Clinton Administration has stepped back. The
occasion of that stepping back may provide an appropriate time
for reconsideration of the meaning of the elusive term "compelling governmental interest."
Part II of this Article tells, in brief, the story of the Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church case (to date), setting
forth that case as a paradigm for consideration of the issues of
interpretation posed by RFRA, and as a paradigm of Government
hostility to free exercise claims. Part III explores the meaning of
"compelling interest," developing the three modest points I have
just sketched. Part IV drives home the larger insight to which
these three smaller insights point: that RFRA restores the "high
water" mark of protection for free exercise, established in
Sherbert and Wisconsin v. Yoder', not the watered-down, justabout-anything-you-can-name-is-compelling approach of late preSmith free exercise jurisprudence. In reaching this conclusion, I

24.

406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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address and respond to the arguments that might be made for a
watered-down reading of RFRA. Finally, Part V concludes with
some institutional solutions for the institutional problem of systemic bureaucratic hostility to free exercise claims. If President
Clinton is serious about RFRA, he must give RFRA serious institutional status within the Justice Department.
II.

CHRISTIANS V. CRYSTAL EVANGELICAL

The ironically-captioned Christians v. Crystal Evangelical
Free Church case seems to pit "Christians" against a church.
Julia Christians, the nominal plaintiff, is a U.S. Bankruptcy
Trustee appointed to represent the interests of creditors of the
personal bankruptcy estate of Bruce and Nancy Young. The
Youngs are members of Crystal Evangelical Free Church, a large
protestant congregation in a Minneapolis suburb. The trustee
brought suit against the Church on behalf of creditors, pursuant
to section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, to recover the
amount that the Youngs had given to the Church as religious
tithes during the year prior to their filing for bankruptcy. The
trustee argued that such tithes constituted a "fraudulent transfer" within the meaning of section 548. Nobody disputes that the
Youngs' tithes were given as a sincere exercise of their religious
faith, and not for any purpose of eluding or defrauding creditors.
Section 548(a)(2), however, is a flat prophylactic rule that authorizes suits to recover funds given by the bankrupt to third parties, during the period of insolvency, for which the bankrupt did
not receive sufficient "value" in exchange. Where there is insuffi25
cient "value," there is deemed to be a "fraudulent transfer."

25. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred
on or within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the
debtor voluntarily or involuntarily(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of
such transfer or obligation . ...

Actual fraud is not required to show a "fraudulent transfer" under section 548(a)(2).
Actual fraud is covered under section 548(a)(1).
The Church has argued that contributions to a church confer "value" on the
contributors, even though there is no requirement of tithing as a condition of church
membership or access to any of its services. Both the bankruptcy court and the district court rejected this argument. Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church (In
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The Church defended on the ground (among others) that
application of section 548(a)(2) to invalidate sincere religious
tithing would violate the Free Exercise Clause rights of the
Church and of its members, the Youngs (whose interests the
Church had third-party standing to assert as a defense to the
proceeding against the Church). The constitutional defense was
made quite a bit more difficult by Employment Division v.
Smith,26 of course. In form, the Church's claim was one for exemption from a rule of general applicability not targeted at religious exercise per se. Smith held that such formally neutral
requirements of law are not subject to the "strict scrutiny" standard formerly applied in Free Exercise Clause adjudication (under the Court's 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Verner27 ). The
Church tried to squeeze the case into one of the exceptions recognized by Smith to its new rule-statutes (like that at issue in
Sherbert itself) that provide for "individualized governmental assessment" of particular circumstances.' In a sense, the whole
process of reorganization of liquidation under the Bankruptcy
Code is one of tailoring general requirements to individualized
circumstances, complete with a multitude of provisions for making individualized accommodations to particular circumstances. 29 There is thus a good argument that the application to parre Young), 152 B.R. 939 (D. Minn. 1993), affg 148 B.R. 886 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1992).
As a matter of pure statutory interpretation of section 548(a)(2), the Church's position is weak, though there is at least a colorable argument that this situation falls
within the rule of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, which holds that where a federal statute presents a significant risk of impairment of religious liberty, Congress should not
be understood as having intended such a result unless it has manifested an "affirmative intention" to include religious conduct and that intention has been "clearly expressed." 440 U.S. 490, 500-01, 504 (1979). There is no such affirmative intention
clearly expressed in the bankruptcy laws, and Congress likely did not contemplate
that section 548(a)(2) would be applied to invalidate sincere religious tithes to a
church in the year prior to bankruptcy.
26. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
27.
28. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884; accord Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2229 (1993) (quoting Smith).
29. Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Codes authorizes a myriad of exemptions to
the claims of creditors: a debtor's home, life insurance policies, business tools or
machinery, personal goods (up to a certain amount), and a great many other items of
property purchased by the debtor. Under the Minnesota statutory exemptions (made
applicable at the debtor's election by section 522(b)(1) of the federal Bankruptcy
Code), a debtor's home is exempt without value limitation, so that an individual
facing bankruptcy can place funds beyond creditors' reach by putting the money into
her home (or buying a more expensive one). Farm machinery and implements are
exempt up to $13,000 in value. Other business tools, machines, or instruments are
exempt up to $7,500. Clothing, furniture, and appliances (including stereos and television sets) are exempt up to $4,500. The statute also makes exceptions in favor of
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ticular cases of the Bankruptcy Code's complex scheme of exemptions fits within the "individualized governmental assessment"
exception recognized in Smith," and that the compelling inter1 therefore applies.
est test of Sherbert v. Verner"
Getting the benefit of the compelling interest test was crucial to the Church's position. If there need only be a "rational
basis" supporting the distinctions drawn in the Bankruptcy
Code, the Church probably loses. The interest in protecting creditors, even if not uniformly pursued throughout the Bankruptcy
Code, is at least rational, even if it is not compelling. On the
other hand, if application of section 548(a)(2) to invalidate the
Youngs' tithes to Crystal Evangelical requires a compelling interest that can be attained by no less restrictive means, the Church
probably wins. The interest in giving creditors a larger percentage on the dollar is real, but not compelling. The fact that the
Bankruptcy Code does not uniformly pursue the interest in maximizing creditors' receipts shows that that interest is something
less than compelling, but is in fact subordinated to other policies,
such as giving debtors some scope of freedom to make non-necessity purchases of their own choice. To treat religious expenditures as less protected than other personal expenditures would
seem to stand the value of religious freedom on its head. One
could speculate that the government has a compelling interest in
preventing fraud by debtors, but such interests have never been
held sufficient to justify a prophylactic rule embracing concededly sincere religious conduct.32 Besides, a different provision of
the Bankruptcy Code, section 548(a)(1), specifically addresses the
situation of actual fraud. Section 548(a)(2), the provision under
which the trustee sued in this case, is essentially a legal fiction
about constructive "fraud." The whole question of the case is
whether such a bright-line prophylactic rule is the least restrictive means of accomplishing some compelling governmental interest. There would seem to be no compelling interest supporting
the bright-line rule that is not already adequately served by
another aspect of the Code.

many other personal expenditures, such as a car.
Thus, if the Youngs had used the equivalent sum of money they tithed to
their church-approximately $13,000-to buy down their mortgage, purchase a tractor, buy some expensive clothes, or buy a big-screen TV set with "Surround Sound"
speakers, the trustee could not have touched those transactions.
30.
494 U.S. at 884.
31.
374 U.S. 398 (1963).
32.
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407; see infra text accompanying notes 83-85.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/11

12

1995]

RFRA Runs
Through It IT
APaulsen:
RFRAARUNS
THROUGH

261

The Church lost in both the Bankruptcy Court (where the
First Amendment argument had not been made) and in the District Court (where it had). The case was fully briefed and ready
for oral argument in the Eighth Circuit when Congress passed
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which explicitly mandates application of the compelling interest standard.3 3 RFRA
was manna from heaven, as far as the Church was concerned.
What had before been a difficult and cumbersome argument of
finding an exception to Smith had become a straightforward
argument of applying a fairly clear federal civil rights statute
that specified that its provisions overrode other federal law.
Enter the Justice Department with the first official, public,
U.S. Government interpretation of RFRA. The Justice Department argued (with respect to both the Church's constitutional
argument and its RFRA argument) that, first, application of
section 548(a)(2) imposed no cognizable "burden" on religious exercise because Bruce and Nancy Young were giving money to the
Church that was not "theirs to give."' The Department
analogized the Youngs' act of tithing to the act of drug kingpins
using proceeds of narcotics transactions to hire high-priced drug
lawyers to defend them. The Department quoted Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States for the proposition that
"[there is no constitutional principle that gives one person the
right to give another's property to a third party, even where the
person seeking to complete the exchange wishes to do so in order
to exercise a constitutionally protected right."' Second, the Department argued that even if application of section 548(a)(2) to

33. There might be some question whether RFRA applies "retroactively" to cases
begun prior to RFRA's enactment. Cf Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S.Ct. 1483
(1994). Though the issue is not free from doubt, the better view is probably that
RFRA does apply to such cases. Unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1991, at issue in
Landgraf, section 6(a) of RFRA is as close as one can get to an express "retroactivity" provision without using the magic words that Landgraf suggests. Section 6(a)
provides that RFRA "applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of
that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after [November 16, 1993]." Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb-3(a). Because RFRA governs with respect to all "implementation" of federal
law-that is, applications of statutes as well as the statutes themselves-it should be
understood as governing appellate cases that have not reached a final disposition. In
Crystal Evangelical, for example, there has been no completed application of section
548(a)(2). The whole question in Crystal Evangelical is whether section 548(a)(2) may
be applied in such a manner. There has not been (as there was in Landgra/) any
prior transaction based on prior law to invalidate.
34. Brief for Intervenor the United States at 30, Crystal Evangelical (No. 932267) (withdrawn).
35.
Id. at 13 (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. 617, 628 (1989)).
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invalidate the Youngs' tithes did burden religious exercise, there
is a compelling interest in "protecting the property of others. ""
The Department's contention, that a compelling interest justifies
any burden, builds on the same Caplinesque premise that the
Youngs were tithing with money that was not theirs to give.
The Department's characterization of the Youngs' conduct as
not involving any legitimate exercise of religion is wooden and
insensitive in the extreme.3 7 It is only because section 548 of
the Bankruptcy Code sometimes permits retroactive invalidation
of transactions that it became remotely plausible for the Department of Justice, in retrospect, to characterize sincere religious
tithing as giving away, in the Department's words, "another
person's property." Even if the characterization has some superficial appeal, it is quite simply wrong as a matter of bankruptcy
law. Unsecured creditors have no "property" right in a debtor's
estate; rather, debtors have unsatisfied personal obligations to
creditors. The "property" is still the debtor's.38 Thus, the
government's highly offensive analogy to forfeiture of drug
dealers' ill-gotten gains is totally inappropriate.
I do not want to dwell further on the Justice Department's
"burden" point (in part because I regard it as so very nearly
absurd as not to merit extended discussion). Rather, I want to
focus on its "compelling interest" point, which provides more
fertile ground for discussion and more general lessons for
RFRA's interpretation. We can learn, by the government's bad
36. Brief for Intervenor the United States at 12, 32.
37. No one disputes that the Youngs' practice of tithing on their income
stream-a practice engaged in consistently over a period of many years-was anything other than a sincere exercise of a profound religious conviction and discipline.
At the time they were tithing, the Youngs were acting in complete good faith (so to
speak). Giving one-tenth of their gross income to God was, as a matter of the
Youngs' religious faith, their first financial obligation. As matters turned out, their
other financial commitments outran their income and they ultimately had to file for
bankruptcy. The record does not reflect it, but according to press reports Bruce
Young suffered a heart attack that led to a near-shutdown of the Youngs' construction business during a period of economic recession. The Youngs depleted numerous
other personal assets before filing bankruptcy-assets that would have been exempt
from the reach of their creditors if the Youngs had filed bankruptcy earlier. Laurie
Goodstein, Religious Groups Fight U.S. in Bankruptcy Case, WASHINGTON POST, May
23, 1994, at Al.
38.
This point is developed at length in the amicus brief of Christian Legal Society, et al. (Response to Brief of Intervenor United States of America by Christian
Legal Society, at 2-10). I was one of the attorneys for this coalition of amici, but
Douglas Laycock was the author of our last brief (responding to the Justice Department position) and should be credited for the many insights therein about the character of bankruptcy law and the absence of any "property" rights by unsecured creditors.
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example in Crystal Evangelical,just what "compelling interest"
does not mean under RFRA.
III. THE MEANING OF "COMPELLING INTEREST" UNDER RFRA:
THREE MODEST POINTS
Section 2 of RFRA specifies that the purpose of the Act is:
to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened. 9
The emphasized words are important. The "compelling interest"
test employed in section 3 of the Act is intended to track the test
employed in Sherbert and Yoder, replicating the broad protection
of religious free exercise recognized in those two cases. This is
significant because, as we shall see, later Supreme Court decisions (not similarly embraced by RFRA) watered down the
"compellingness" of what it takes to be a compelling interest."
As formulated and applied in Sherbert and Yoder, the test is
an extremely rigorous one, referring to an extremely narrow
range of permissible justifications for infringements on religious
liberty. Not every legitimate, or even very important, interest of
government qualifies. Only interests "of the highest order" and
"not otherwise served" qualify, in the words of Yoder.4'
Sherbert's words are even more strict: Only "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation" of religious exercise.42
What is a "paramount" government interest and how do you

39. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b)(1), 107 Stat. at 1488; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)
(Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
I address below the argument that Congress intended to adopt the watered40.
down approach of subsequent cases, rather than the rigorous version of the compelling interest test set forth in Sherbert and Yoder. See infra text accompanying notes
105-16. Suffice it to say here that section 2 of RFRA, which specifies RFRA's "purposes," at the very least establishes a powerful presumption that the test "as set
forth in" Sherbert and Yoder is at least as stringent as needed to produce the outcomes in those two cases (which, even under Smith, remain good law and therefore
constitute a "floor" beneath which Congress presumably did not intend for RFRA to
sink). The arguments set forth infra will also tend to show that the simple fact of
RFRA's enactment, with its super-statute provisions, entails a rejection of the Court's
late pre-Smith pattern of blind deference to interests reflected in federal statutes or
claims of federal agencies.
41. 406 U.S. at 215.
42. 374 U.S. at 406 (emphasis added) (original quotation marks and citations
omitted).
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know one when you see one? This question has dogged the Supreme Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence for decades
and challenged commentators for the same time. I will not pretend to offer a comprehensive answer here. Instead, I offer some
minimalist insights into what a paramount, or compelling, government interest is not.
A. A Governmental Interest Does Not Qualify as "Compelling"
Within the Meaning of RFRA Where It Is Not Uniformly
Pursued With Respect to All Situations of the Same Category
First and most clearly, an interest cannot be "compelling"
where government fails to uniformly pursue that interest wherever it arises, but only pursues it occasionally, sporadically, or
inconsistently. The lack of systematic pursuit belies the assertion
of compelling importance.
In the free speech context, a statute treading on expression
is unconstitutionally "overnarrow" if the government does not
pursue its assertedly compelling justification in other contexts
not presenting the same interference with expression.43 The Supreme Court expressly embraced this principle, in the constitutional free exercise context, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah," decided in 1993. Lukumi involved a
Free Exercise Clause challenge to the constitutionality of a group
of municipal ordinances that effectively prohibited the killing of
certain animals, but only when the killing was done for religious
purposes. The Court applied the compelling interest test because
it found that the ordinances intentionally targeted religious
conduct (and therefore did not fall within Smith's rule concerning genuinely neutral, generally applicable laws). The Court
rejected the City's assertions of compelling interests in public
health, sanitation, and order, relying in large part on the many
exemptions from the prohibition provided by the overall statutory scheme. Embracing the language of Justice Scalia's concur-

43.
See generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A
TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, §2.06(B), at 2-94 (1984). See,

e.g., The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1989); Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983). See also
Michael Stokes Paulsen & Michael W. McConnell, The Doubtful Constitutionality of
the Clinic Access Bill, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 261, 283 (1994) (criticizing proposed
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act on the ground that it singles out for special punishment unlawful protests addressed to certain subjects only, and is therefore
content and viewpoint discriminatory).
44.
113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
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rence (and the approach of the full Court) in The FloridaStar v.
B.J.F., a free speech/free press case holding that Florida's rape
victim shield statute is unconstitutional,45 the Court in Lukumi
wrote:
Where government restricts only conduct protected by the First
Amendment and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict
other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of
the same sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction is not compelling. It is established in our strict scrutiny
jurisprudence that "a law cannot be regarded as protecting an
interest 'of the highest order'. . . when it leaves appreciable
damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited." The
Florida Star v. B.J.F., supra, 491 U.S. [524], at 541-542...

(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(citation omitted [by Court] ).46
It is, of course, unclear whether Congress in enacting RFRA
consciously understood "compelling interest" to embrace this
principle. Lukumi, B.J.F., and other cases applying this principle
as part of strict scrutiny jurisprudence were before Congress at
the time RFRA was adopted. However, as I will argue below, it
is a perilous enterprise to ascribe to Congress, absent a clear
statement to such effect, an intention to "incorporate by reference" particular applicationsof prior legal standards (as opposed
to general principles) merely because the legal standard employed in the prior cases is subsequently adopted as a legal term
of art for a statute. Sherbert and Yoder are the only two cases
specifically embraced by RFRA. Lukumi and B.J.F., however, are
persuasive statements concerning the boundaries of government
assertions of "compelling interest" under RFRA, not simply because they existed as cases prior to RFRA's adoption, but because they make concrete sense of Sherbert's and Yoder's command that a state interest must be one "of the highest order,"
"paramount," and "not otherwise served." Moreover, the principle
of Lukumi and B.J.F. (that an asserted interest is not compelling
if not generally pursued) is not one that is substantially controverted by courts or commentators.
That principle is controverted, however (albeit not in very
straightforward terms), by the Department of Justice's brief in
Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church. As noted above,

the Church and its amici argued that the policy of maximizing
45.
46.

491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
113 S. Ct. at 2234 (emphasis added).
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creditors' economic returns, even if important as a general proposition, is not "compelling" in either the constitutional sense or
the sense in which RFRA uses the term, because it is not uniformly pursued but is instead subordinated repeatedly to other
ordinary policy interests, as illustrated by the Bankruptcy Code's
myriad exemptions.47 The Justice Department's response was
that "[siection 548's religious neutrality is properly evaluated
only by considering that [slection alone."4 8 In the wake of
Lukumi, this cavalier response is little short of incredible. In
essence, the Department argued that courts should evaluate the
compellingness of the state's interest without even looking at the
myriad ways in which the statutory scheme "leaves appreciable
damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited."49
The government's position may be mildly incredible, but it is
not at all atypical. Throughout the 1980s, the Department of
Justice took the view in Free Exercise Clause cases that a government interest is "compelling" even though not consistently
pursued within the relevant statutory scheme.
United States v. Lee5" is the leading exhibit in this category.
Lee involved a challenge by a member of the Old Order Amish to
mandatory participation in the social security system. The Amish
community to which Edwin Lee belonged had a well developed
system of providing for their own elderly and infirm and objected
on sincere religious grounds to paying social security taxes. Lee
would seem to have had a good claim in light of Yoder. The Department of Justice, however, argued that the government had a
compelling interest "in maintaining widespread participation in
the social security program" and that "[tihe government's ability
to maintain a comprehensive social security program for the
nation's unemployed and senior citizens would be severely
strained if all those who could provide for themselves, either by
individual or community efforts, could voluntarily withdraw from
the program."5 '
The Government's position sounds plausible enough, but
there is something fishy about it. Given that the relief sought by
Mr. Lee was simply a personal exemption from the usual requirement because of a conflict with religious obligation-not nullification of social security taxes for everyone--the Government

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Brief for Intervenor the United States at 38.
Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2234 (original quotation marks and citations omitted).
455 U.S. 252 (1982).
Brief for the United States at 11, Lee (No. 80-767).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/11

18

1995]

RFRA Runs
Through It IT
APaulsen:
RFRAA RUNS
THROUGH

267

could surely exempt the Amish and still maintain "widespread"
participation in the social security system. If the compelling
interest is widespread participation, exemption of the Amish
(and others similarly situated) is not much of a threat to it. On
the other hand, if the compelling interest is uniform participation (at least in the taxation part if not in the benefits part-as
other parts of the Department's brief suggest),52 then the
Department's position in Lee comes squarely up against the
underinclusiveness problem, for Congress had consciously exempted the Amish from the alternative self-employment social
security tax. True, Congress had exempted self-employed Amish
but not Amish employers. But how could the federal
government's interest in mandatory participation be thought so
compelling as to override conflicting Amish beliefs, where the
government did not always pursue that interest, and where its
decision not to pursue that interest was premised on the fact
that doing so would conflict with Amish beliefs?
The Department of Justice argued that Congress was under
no constitutional compulsion to adopt the self-employment accommodation in the first place.5" Perhaps true. 4 But that is
not responsive to the point, which is that the government's assertion of a compelling interest in mandatory, uniform participation
is belied by the failure of the government to pursue that interest
consistently in closely analogous circumstances. Had the government pursued that interest uniformly, Lee might have been a
different case-one in which the government's assertion of a
compelling interest might be believable, and thus have to be
weighed on its merits. But the assertion of a compelling interest
in uniform enforcement of the social security regime was implausible in the face of the statutory scheme as it actually existed. 5

52. Id. at 11, 27.
53. Id. at 12, 14, 29-37.
54. Perhaps not, at least under pre-Smith standards. If a "compelling" interest-an implied, atextual exception to a seemingly absolutist text (cf Douglas
Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 233)-must
be one of truly overriding social importance because of its necessity to preserve the
health, safety, or well-being of the community as a whole, inclusion of self-employed
Amish farmers in the social security system scarcely qualifies.
55. The Supreme Court accepted the government's position in United States v.
Lee. "[Miandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social
security system . . . . Thus, the government's interest in assuring mandatory and
continuous participation in and contribution to the social security system is very
high." 455 U.S. at 258-59.
In the same passage, the Court embraced the government's argument from
administrative convenience: "Moreover, a comprehensive national social security sys-
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So too with the Supreme Court's outrageous 1989 decision in
5 6 At issue in Hernandez
Hernandez v. Commissioner.
was the
deductibility of religious contributions to the Church of
Scientology for Church "auditing" (religious training) sessions.
The IRS disallowed such deductions pursuant to a regulation-an executive branch interpretation of the tax statutes, not
the statutes themselves-holding that a contribution is not a
true "gift" if there is some quid pro quo. The government, relying
on Lee, took the position that the soundness of the tax system
depends on the government's ability to apply the tax law in a
uniform and evenhanded fashion.5 7 But the evidence was clear
that the government did not take this position with respect to
analogous practices-including analogous religious practices-such as "pew rents" or sales of tickets for Jewish High Holy
Day services. The IRS had a formal written policy stating that
those contributions were deductible.58 Yet the "quid pro quo"
feature of these contributions is indistinguishable from the arrangement in Hernandez, as Justice O'Connor's dissent rightly
pointed out. 9 Inconsistency of the policy should have belied the
assertion of a compelling interest in "maintaining a sound tax
system," free from "myriad exceptions."' Indeed, Hernandez
seems to be a blatant case of discrimination among religions.
The government's ostensibly compelling interest in uniformity is illustrated most literally in Goldman v. Weinberger,"'
where the Court upheld the dishonorable discharge of a Jewish
Air Force Captain for his refusal to doff his non-uniform "headgear"-to wit, a yarmulke. The record showed that Captain
Goldman had served as a Navy chaplain for many years (wearing his yarmulke the whole time), returned to the military as an
Air Force clinical psychologist following completion of a Ph.D.,

tem providing for voluntary participation would be almost a contradiction in terms
and difficult, if not impossible, to administer." Id. at 258. The Supreme Court also
thought that social security taxes are indistinguishable in principle from any other
tax, and that we simply cannot have individuals making free exercise claims to exemption from taxes. Id. at 260. 1 will address the administrative convenience and
"slippery slope" points in Lee below. See infra text accompanying notes 89-92.
56. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
57. Brief for the Respondent at 47-49, Hernandez (Nos. 87-963 & 87-1616).
58. 490 U.S. at 701 ("Pew rents, building fund assessments, and periodic dues
paid to a church . . . are all methods of making contributions to the church, and
such payments are deductible as charitable contributions within the limitations set
out in section 170 of the Code.") (quoting Rev. Rul. 70-47, 1970-1 C.B. 49)).
59. Id. at 706-710 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 699 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 260).
61. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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and continued to wear a yarmulke for several years until a new
base commander took exception to his wearing it-a problem
first brought to the commander's attention after Captain
Goldman wore his yarmulke while testifying as a defense witness in a court-martial proceeding.
The government's argument was, first, that the compelling
interest test has no applicability in the military context and,
second, if it does, the military's interest in maintaining discipline, morale, and image creates a compelling interest in strict
enforcement of uniform requirements. 2 Counsel for Goldman
did not make any estoppel or due process argument, apparently
preferring to seek a broader free exercise precedent." The
Court, however, adopted the government's position that the compelling interest test does not apply to the military.' But the
proper resolution of the case would seem to turn on the
military's long non-enforcement of the non-uniform headgear
rule, as applied to Captain Goldman's yarmulke. If the compelling interest in national security forbids yarmulkes in the military, it should have forbidden them for all the years that Simcha
Goldman wore his yarmulke in the Navy and the Air Force. 5
The Justice Department's brief in Crystal Evangelical echoed
its exaggerated assertions of compelling interest in its Supreme
Court briefs in Lee, Hernandez, and Goldman. In essence, the
Department's position in Crystal Evangelical was that government has a compelling interest in uniform application of the
Bankruptcy Code provisions that benefit creditors. No matter
that the Bankruptcy Code does not pursue this policy consistently but instead subordinates it to a broad range of other policies.
Those sections, the Department argued, should be ignored for
purposes of determining the government's compelling interest in
enforcement of section 548(a)(2).'
If RFRA means anything, it means that that argument is
wrong. An
interest not pursued with paramount rigor and consis1

62. Brief for the Respondents at 21, 49, Goldman (No. 84-1097).
63. See Brief for the Petitioner at 5-9.
64. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507 (refusing to apply the Sherbert standard in the
military context).
65. Congress apparently did not in fact view the interest in rigid uniformity to
be one of compelling necessity to military discipline. In response to Goldman, Congress enacted a statute providing that religious headgear (or other apparel) may be
worn with military uniforms, if the headgear (or other apparel) is "neat and conservative." 10 U.S.C. § 774(b) (1988).
66. Brief for Intervenor the United States at 20-21.
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67
tency is not a paramount interest.

B. A Governmental Interest Does Not Qualify As "Compelling"
Within the Meaning of RFRA Merely Because It Reflects a Policy
Embodied in a CongressionalStatute
My second modest insight into what may not count as a
"compelling interest" of the federal government flows from the
nature of RFRA as a federal super-statute. Section 6(a) provides
that RFRA "applies to all Federal... law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether
adopted before or after the enactment of this Act."' In short,
RFRA trumps contrary federal law-and there are no exceptions
to its applicability.The pre-Smith holes that the Supreme Court
had carved out to the compelling interest test-the military ex-

67.
The problem of claimed exemption from taxation on the grounds of an asserted conflict with religious principles tests the limits of my first "modest" proposal.
The tax code has zillions of exemptions, exclusions, and deductions: revenue maximization is certainly not pursued uniformly. Does that mean that the government lacks
the requisite "compelling interest" to *trump a religious claim to tax exemption? Not
necessarily. But it does mean that neither revenue maximization per se nor uniformity for the sake of uniformity constitute compelling interests.
'Compellingness," if it exists, must be found on other grounds: If, for example,
it were true as an empirical matter that granting bona fide religious claims demonstrably would result in a substantial loss of revenue, so as to pose a substantial
threat to the national government's ability to carry out even its most basic constitutional functions-such as providing for the common defense and the general welfare-that would constitute a compelling interest requiring that religious claims be
denied across-the-board. (Fairness requires that all such claims be treated alike for
compelling constitutional reasons of equal treatment of all religious beliefs.) But that
is a far cry from Lee, Hernandez, or Crystal Evangelical. Likewise, if the incentive to
fabricate spurious claims and the difficulty of sorting out bona fide from spurious
claims without violating other constitutional principles proved to impose insurmountable burdens on the tax-administering authority, that might well supply a compelling
justification for (equal) denial of religion-based exemptions. That too is a far cry from
Lee, and from Crystal Evangelical. Moreover, as discussed below, under Sherbert, the
government must bear the burden of proof as to the likelihood of fraudulent claims
and its inability to address such a problem in any other feasible manner. See infra
text accompanying notes 83-84. In this respect, Sherbert seems very apposite to the
situations of both Lee and Crystal Evangelical.
In short, in the absence of evidence of serious harms of the sort hypothesized,
I am not prepared to exclude the possibility of religion-based claims of exemption
from certain taxation requirements. This position may sound extreme in principle,
but it doubtless would not be in practice. It is clear that, in the post-Smith world,
these sorts of claims have no chance of success under the Free Exercise Clause. And
if such claims brought pursuant to RFRA indeed proved to create enormous problems, Congress could assert a "compelling" interest simply by exempting the tax code
from RFRA.
68. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a)
(Supp. V 1993).
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ception, the prison exception, and (at least arguably) the it's-ourland-we-stole-it-fair-and-square exception-are plugged by
RFRA.6" This is especially noteworthy in light of the legislative
battles over whether to put certain exceptions in the statute.0
Moreover, section 6(b) of RFRA provides that "Federal statutory
law adopted after the date of the enactment of this Act is subject
to this Act unless such law explicitly excludes such application
by reference to this Act."" This significantly reinforces section
6(a)'s original super-statute message. Congress has said, in effect: "If we wanted any exceptions to the compelling interest test,
we would have written them into RFRA; and if we want any
exceptions to the compelling interest test in the future, we will
write them in explicit terms that reference RFRA."
Section 6 of RFRA should take out of the mouth of the federal government one of its favorite arguments: that there exists a
"compelling interest" in the uniform application of a federal statutory (or regulatory) scheme simply because that is the way
Congress drafted the statute. In light of RFRA, the federal government may not satisfy the compelling interest requirement
just by pointing to another federal statute (and still less by
pointing to a mere regulation). If Congress had intended that
such statute not be subject to RFRA's compelling interest test
where its application burdens religious liberty-that is, if Congress had intended to exempt some federal program or statute
from RFRA-it would have said so. The fact that it did not say
so means that the Justice Department must look elsewhere to
establish the "compellingness" of its asserted interest.

69.
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342 (1987); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.
439 (1988).
Lyng was decided on the theory that the government's building of a road
through a Native American sacred ground did not constitute a cognizable "burden" on
religious exercise, even though the Court was willing to assume that the religion
would be destroyed by such action. 485 U.S. at 451. Whether RFRA changes the
"burden" analysis in a way that would alter the result in Lyng is beyond the scope
of this Article. Nonetheless, it strikes me that underlying Lyng is the intuition, monstrously cast by the Court in terms of lack of any "burden" on religious exercise,
that the compelling interest standard is simply inappropriate for cases of government
land management-that is, that government land management, like prison management or military regulations, is an area that should not be subjected to the same
exacting scrutiny as is applied in other areas. If Lyng is best read this way (and I
again emphasize that that is not the way the Court wrote its opinion), RFRA could
be understood as ending this "exception" as well.
70. These debates are ably summarized in Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 233-245 (1993).
71.
Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(b), 107 Stat. at 1489; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(b).
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The Government therefore may no longer argue, as it did in
United States v. Lee, that Congress struck the balance between
the needs of the Amish and the needs of the social security system a particular way, and that Congress' decision not to exempt
employers with religious scruples the same as it did self-employed individuals with religious scruples shows that its interest
is "compelling" in the former situation."2 The Government may
no longer argue, as it did in Bowen v. Roy,73 that the fact that
Congress has not provided statutory religious exemptions from
the requirement that AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent
Children) beneficiaries obtain and provide social security numbers demonstrates that "Congress has determined that the compelling governmental interest in verifying program eligibility and
preventing welfare fraud cannot be reconciled with the granting
of exemptions."7 4 The Government may no longer argue, as it
did in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,75
that, simply because Congress possesses constitutional power in
a certain field (like federal lands), the laws it passes in that field
are, for that reason and that reason alone, sufficiently compelling to override competing claims of religious liberty.76 The Government may no longer argue, as it did in Goldman v.
Weinberger,77 that whatever uniform regulations Congress (or
the military) imposes necessarily satisfy a compelling interest in
maintaining discipline, morale, esprit des corps, image, and
teamwork."8

72.
Brief for the United States at 11-14, Lee (No. 80-767) ("In sum, Section
1402(g) represents a reasonable compromise between the interest of the government
in insuring maximum participation in, and contribution to, the social security system,
on the one hand, and the possibly conflicting beliefs of certain religious groups, on
the other . . . . The balance it has struck does not violate the First Amendment
rights of appellee or the other members of the Old Order Amish sect whom he employs.") Id. at 32-38 (arguing that Court should defer to legislative categories in this
area so long as there is a rational basis for Congress' choice).
73.
476 U.S. 693 (1986).
74.
Brief for the Appellants at 39, Roy (No. 84-780); see id. at 33 (noting "the
impropriety of ignoring a legislative determination that individualized exemptions
would undermine the purposes behind a neutral law of general applicability"); see
also id. at 29.
75.
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
Brief for the Petitioners at 38-39, Lyng (No. 86-1013) ("This Court repeated76.
ly has recognized the significance of the federal interest in putting such [statutory]
determinations into effect, stating that the United States 'no less than a private
owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use
to which it is lawfully dedicated.') (original quotation marks altered and citations
omitted).
77.
475 U.S. 503 (1986).
Brief for the Respondents at 49, Goldman (No. 84-1097).
78.
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Given section 6 of RFRA, the substance and form of the
Government's arguments in each of these cases would no longer
make sense as a defense to a RFRA claim, because Congress neither explicitly exempted these areas of federal law from RFRA
nor otherwise attempted to designate the asserted interests as
"compelling." Congress did not exempt the tax code from RFRA.
Congress did not exempt the Social Security Act from RFRA.
Congress did not exempt the AFDC program from RFRA. Congress did not exempt federal land management from RFRA.
Congress did not exempt the military from RFRA. Congress did
not even exempt the civil rights laws from RFRA. That is not to
say that compelling interests may not be found in such statutory
areas. But it is to say that compelling interests, may not be found
simply because of the present existence and form of such
statutory schemes. Moreover, the presumption should be to the
contrary: Congress, by failing to exclude given programs or policies from RFRA, has implicitly conceded that none of those interests is categorically "compelling."
The Justice Department's brief in Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical ignored this obvious point. The Department continued to trot out the well-worn, tired argument that Congress'
action in drafting the Bankruptcy Code a certain way reflects a
compelling interest in protecting creditors' remedies against the
bankrupt estate, and that that interest is compelling-surprise!--exactly to the extent that it is reflected in
Congress' enactment."9 What the Department of Justice forgot
was that the Bankruptcy Code now has RFRA running through
it. Congress did not exempt the Bankruptcy Code from RFRA;
RFRA therefore qualifies this statutory scheme as well. Given
RFRA, there is no plausible claim that Congress has asserted a
compelling interest in maximizing creditors' returns in bankruptcy proceedings, as against religious liberty claims by churches
that they should not be forced to turn over to the government
their members' sincere tithes and offerings. Congress' interest in
protecting creditors is now subject to the new statutory condition
that such remedies not burden religious liberty without compelling justification. The fact that the Bankruptcy Code (formerly)
did not recognize religious liberty interests cannot provide the

79.
Brief for Intervenor the United States at 38, Crystal Evangelical (No. 932267) ("[Wlhether Congress pursued the interests underlying [section 548 with adequate consistency can only be judged by that [s]ection alone."); see also id. at 20-21,

32-35.
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basis for a claim that there is a compelling interest for purposes
of RFRA.
C. The Federal Government Does Not Possess a "Compelling
Interest," within the Meaning of RFRA, in Avoiding the Costs,
Inconvenience, or Difficulties Associated With GrantingReligious
Exemptions from FederalLaws
My third point about the meaning of "compelling interest"
under RFRA is a more specific application of the second point. It
is also, I believe, an a fortiori point: If a government interest
does not qualify as compelling merely by virtue of the fact Congress has passed a law pursuing that interest, it is all the more
clear that there is no compelling interest in any particular administrative scheme for carrying out that interest, where that
administrative scheme is not specified by congressional statute.
The everyday policy interests of the federal government in efficiency, administrative convenience, and avoidance of the costs
associated with making exceptions to general rules, do not in
and of themselves qualify as "compelling" governmental policy
interests. If this point was in doubt before RFRA, it should not
be in doubt after RFRA. RFRA is a congressional mandate that
federal agencies make the effort, and bear the cost, of accommodating sincere religious exercise, with all the difficulties that that
may entail for government. In short, Congress, in enacting RFRA,
has expressed the judgment that the protection of religious liberty is a weighty federal interest, too. It would be absurd to
allow government bureaucrats to defeat that judgment by arguing that the task is too difficult or inconvenient. RFRA may
cause some bureaucratic headaches, but making life easier for
bureaucrats is surely not a "paramount" interest "of the highest
order." If it were, Congress wouldn't have passed RFRA, which is
certain to make life more difficult for the operation of federal
programs. Indeed, the whole point of RFRA would seem to be to
make it more difficult for government bureaucrats implementing
government programs to do so in a way that adversely affects
religious exercise. RFRA is designed to cramp bureaucrats' style.
But surely (it is inevitably argued in response) the government interest in administrative efficiency, or the possibility of
spurious claims for religious exemption, at some point becomes
an interest so compelling as to prevail over claims of religious
free exercise. Otherwise, the government program might be rendered substantially less effectual by virtue of the burdens of
accommodating religion and separating the sincere from the sinhttps://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/11
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ister. The answer to this objection, I submit, is contained in
RFRA's adoption of the Sherbert case as a baseline. Sherbert
makes three points that are directly relevant here and that were
all too often ignored in the late pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause
cases.
First, concerns about administrability or impairment of
government programs are relevant only to the extent that the
government program at issue is itself compelling. "[I]n this
highly sensitive constitutional area," Justice Brennan wrote for
the Court in Sherbert, "only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."'
Unemployment compensation may be a worthwhile and valuable
government program, but Sherbert does not for a minute treat
unemployment compensation programs as themselves "paramount" interests of government. Under the Sherbert formulation,
even substantial impairment of non-paramount government
policy interests must be permitted, if necessary to protect the
free exercise of religion. The constitutional protection of religious
exercise is paramount, not every government program.
RFRA directly adopts Sherbert as setting the standard for
the compelling interest test.81 Since Congress has made every
federal statute and program subject to RFRA-put another way,
since every federal statute and program is now conditioned by a
supervening requirement of accommodating religious liberty-compliance with RFRA might well mean that certain federal
programs will be fifty percent less efficient, due to the bureaucratic headaches created by accommodation of religion. But if the
program is not itself a paramount interest of government, so be
it. RFRA provides that protection of religious liberty is categorically a superior government interest to administrative efficiency
in programs that are not themselves compelling interests of
government.82 It may take some time for federal bureaucrats,
fond of thinking very highly of the importance of the programs
they administer, to accept this. Maybe the resistant institutional
mindset of the bureaucrats can be overcome if they can be convinced that they no longer are administering just their petty

80. 374 U.S. 406 (emphasis added) (original quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
81.
Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b)(1), 107 Stat. at 1488; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)
(Supp. V 1993); see also supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
82. The proposition in the text holds true once the threshold trigger of a "substantial burden" is established. Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3(a)-(b), 107 Stat. at 1488-89;
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) to (b).
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programs, but their petty programs plus the most sweeping protection of religious freedom enacted since Jefferson's Bill Establishing Religious Freedom (now that Smith has taken the First
Amendment out of the running). What a noble undertaking!
Sherbert's second lesson is that even where problems of
administration are alleged to threaten genuinely paramount
government interests, the government bears the burden of proof
as to the reality of the threat. 83 As to the state's fear of fraudulent religious claims in the Sherbert case, the Court noted:
The appellees suggest no more than a possibility that the filing
of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work might not only dilute the
unemployment compensation fund but also hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work .... [That argument was not pressed in the state court.] Nor, if the contention
had been made below, would the record appear to sustain it;
there is no proof whatever to warrant such fears of malingering
or deceit as those which the respondents now advance."
In a nutshell, Sherbert's response to the slippery-slope, everybody-will-do-this argument is "prove it." (And, as just noted,
prove that at the bottom of this slippery slope lies a grave threat
to a paramount interest of society, not merely the impairment of
some government program.)
Third, Sherbert recognized the problem with intrusive inquiry into individuals' religious beliefs in order to assess the bona
fides of a religious claimant. How may such an inquiry be conducted without degenerating into a forbidden inquiry into the
truth, falsity, or validity of individuals' religious beliefs-some
sort of modern constitutional religious inquisition-or discrimination against disfavored or unfamiliar religions? 5 RFRA, in
following Sherbert, necessarily rejects the argument-so often
made by the U.S. Government in the late, pre-Smith cases (and
a personal favorite of Justice Stevens) 5S-that government sim-

83. Government also bears the burden of showing the absence of alternative
means of safeguarding against that threat, but that falls under the "least restrictive
means" aspect of the Sherbert test.
84. 374 U.S. at 407.
85. Id. (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)); see also Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("In my opinion, the principal reason for adopting a strong presumption
against such [free exercise] claims is not a matter of administrative convenience. It
is the overriding interest in keeping the government-whether it be the legislature or
the courts--out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious
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ply should not grant religious exemptions because the very process of inquiry necessary to separate the sincere from the spurious threatens other religious liberty values. I call this the degenerate case of religious liberty: there exists a hypothetical right to
the free exercise of religion, but one that we should not ever
recognize because of the inquiry involved and the danger of discrimination presented if the inquiry is mishandled.
RFRA, by virtue of its enactment, says "make the inquiry."
Sherbert's solution to the problem, implicitly embraced by RFRA,
was dramatically different than Justice Stevens': Religious freedom is an affirmative substantive right, not a nondiscrimination
principle. Religious freedom is not achieved by a requirement
that all religions be subjected to equal hostility. The requirement
of religious neutrality is designed to subserve the value of religious liberty, not to strangle it. Government must therefore undertake the effort to accommodate bona fide religious exercise,
despite the risks. However government conducts this process, the
integrity and autonomy of the religious claimant must be respected.8 7 This aspect of Sherbert evolved into the doctrine that
government may engage in only a "threshold" inquiry into "sincerity."' Inevitably, this places a heavy thumb on the scale on
the side of religious claimants, sincere or otherwise. The sincerity standard operates much as the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard, the presumption of innocence, and other procedural
protections function in criminal cases: Better that a goodly number of "guilty" claims survive, than that any "innocent" religious
claims be wrongly rejected. This drives bureaucrats nuts: "You
mean to say that unless we can prove that an individual is lying
about the religious claim, we must give him the benefit of the
doubt and treat the claim as a legitimate one, requiring a compelling justification separate and apart from the fact that this
might lead to spurious claims? Don't you realize that this would
mean that many bogus claims would have to be granted?" If
Sherbert is taken seriously, the answers are: yes and yes. That
some unmeritorious claims of religious exemption will prevail, in
order to avoid discrimination among religions or overly-intrusive

claims."); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 512 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("The interest in uniformity, however, has a dimension that is of still greater importance for me. It is the interest in uniform treatment for the members of all religious
faiths.").
87.
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
88.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1242-51 (2d ed.
1988).
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inquiries into claimants' religious beliefs, is an administrative
burden that Sherbert contemplates, and that RFRA must be
understood to embrace as well.
To review, administrative burdens-even quite severe
ones--created by the need to accommodate religion do not rise to
the level of "compelling governmental interests" unless the administrative problem threatens a paramount interest of government and the government can prove, with real evidence, the
reality of this threat. Congress, through RFRA, has said that it
values religious freedom and accommodation more than it values
administrative efficiency and bureaucratic convenience, unless it
specifically says otherwise by statute in a particular circumstance. Moreover, Congress, by enacting RFRA, has said that the
cost of evaluating religious claims, with the sensitivity necessary
to avoid putting religious beliefs on trial, must be endured.
If these arguments are sound, RFRA has worked a powerful
change in the law far beyond displacing the Smith standard. The
federal government frequently made arguments of the administrative convenience or slippery-slope variety prior to Smith, contending that granting religious accommodation would open up
the possibility of more religious claims, that it would be difficult
to distinguish between legitimate and spurious claims, and that
the potential for fraud or abuse permitted government to slam
the door against any such claims at the outset. The Supreme
Court, often flying in the face of Sherbert, frequently sustained
such arguments by the government.
United States v. Lee again provides an example. "If the
government's power to levy generally imposed taxes must yield
to the religious beliefs of the particular individuals in this proceeding," the Justice Department's brief argued, "then it presumably must also yield to the sincere religious beliefs of any other
taxpayer who may oppose on religious grounds the payment of
these or other taxes."8 9 The presumption is correct, but the insinuation, made explicit in the next sentence, is that granting
exemption in Lee would open the floodgates to religious free
exercise claims to tax exemption. Sherbert's rejoinder is two-fold:
First, prove it. While government bureaucrats naturally have a
fear of religious exemptions, the number of persons whose sincere religious convictions preclude them from paying taxes is
likely not anywhere near as large as feared. Second, prove that
exempting these religious claims threatens a "paramount" inter-

89.

Brief for the United States at 16, Lee (No. 80-767).
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est. If there is proof that the number of such claims would be so
large as unacceptably to threaten the ability of the government
to collect the taxes needed to run the country, that might indeed
be an overriding, "compelling" interest. But that is a far cry from
Lee. There was no evidence of a substantial number of similarlysituated religious claimants who would seek exemption from
social security (only the government's hypothesis);' there was
no evidence that granting exemption to all such similarly-situated persons would pose a "grave threat" to the social security
system (the Court noted only that a system of complete "voluntary participation would be... difficult, if not impossible, to
administer");9 1 and there was no serious discussion of why the
social security system is of "paramount" importance (as opposed
to simply being a very big government program).'
Slippery-slope arguments were prominent in Goldman v.
Weinberger as well. Acceptance of Captain Goldman's claimed
constitutional right to wear a yarmulke would, in the Justice
Department's view, "forc[e] the military to choose between virtual abandonment of its uniform regulations and constitutionally
impermissible line drawing."93 (Presumably, the Department of
Justice believes that Congress' post-Goldman action in passing a
statute permitting "neat and conservative" attire compelled by a
soldier's or sailor's religion is both unconstitutional and destructive of a compelling national interest.)' Sherbert, of course, forbids "impermissible line drawing" that favors some religions over
others, but that only means that the military might have had to
allow some turbans, shaved heads, or dreadlocks. If the truly
compelling interest is military discipline and readiness, and not
(as it surely cannot be) uniformity for its own sake, it should be

90. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982).
91. Id. at 258.
92.
Because the social security system is nationwide, the governmental interest
is apparent. The social security system in the United States serves the
public interest by providing a comprehensive insurance system with a variety of benefits available to all participants, with costs shared by employers
and employees. The social security system is by far the largest domestic
governmental program in the United States today, distributing approximately $11 billion monthly to 36 million Americans.
Id. This discussion only establishes that the social security system is "nationwide" in
scope, that the program is large and expensive, and that it serves a "public interest."
That does not suffice, I submit, to establish that the governmental interest in this
large, nationwide program that serves the public is of "paramount" importance.
93. Brief for the Respondents at 19, Goldman (No. 84-1097).
94.
10 U.S.C. § 774(b) (1988).
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open to the military to prove "that substantial numbers of members of these sects have enlisted and would be likely to request
exemptions" (an argument the Court of Appeals had considered
and rejected) 5 and that a breakdown in necessary military discipline likely would result. In the absence of such proof, the
Court's decision in Goldman cannot be reconciled with the
Sherbert standard. The Court apparently recognized this problem, and so exempted the military from the Sherbert standard
altogether. RFRA, however, does not exempt the military from
Sherbert. A serviceman requesting, on religious grounds, permission to maintain a non-uniform hairstyle-even one his commanders do not regard as "conservative"-has a good claim under RFRA.98
By far my favorite example of bureaucratic paranoia breeding hostility to religion is the fascinating 1986 Supreme Court
case of Bowen v. Roy. Administrative convenience was the entirety of the Justice Department's argument in Bowen v. Roy for
requiring Native American parents to obtain for their daughter
and provide to the government a social security number (SSN),
as a condition of receiving AFDC payments for her.97 The Roys
believed that this would "rob the Spirit" of their daughter, Little
Bird of the Snow, and asked that she be identified by her name,
not a number.9" The Government's argument was that invalidation of the SSN identifier requirement, even in one case, "jeopardizes the government's ability to combat fraud in federal welfare
programs and generally to promote the administrative efficiency
of such programs through the uniform application of a neutral
rule of unquestionable rationality."9 9
The Justice Department's brief barely made a pretense at
applying the Sherbert standard. While not framed as an argument for overruling Sherbert, the Roy brief was a subtle assault
on Sherbert's approach. There is little talk of the government's
ostensibly "compelling" interests and, as the quoted passage

95.
Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531, 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
96. So too with prisoners, as Professor Lupu's article demonstrates. Lupu, supra
note 10, at 203-05. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987), carved out
prisons as enclaves exempt from Sherbert's reach. The Justice Department's amicus
brief, which urged a "reasonably related to legitimate penological goals" standard,
argued that the regulations at issue were reasonable in part because of the specter
of a large number of prisoner claims for religious accommodation.
97. 476 U.S. 693, 701-12 (1986).
98. Id. at 696-97.
99. Brief for the Appellants at 20, Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (No. 84-780)
(1986).
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illustrates, much of "administrative efficiency," "uniform application," and "rationality." But, under Sherbert, the government
probably does not have a sufficiently compelling interest in the
AFDC program and certainly does not have one in any particular
feature of the bureaucratic scheme for administering it (like the
social security number identifier requirement) to justify an absolute ban on religious exemptions. The asserted interest in preventing fraud is squarely controlled by Sherbert: The government
must prove that the danger of fraud exists and that there is no
means of guarding against such fraud short of denying the
claimants' free exercise of their religion. Sherbert's response to
concerns of administrative efficiency is that such concerns are
not themselves interests of paramount importance. Religious
liberty is.
Under Sherbert, the un-compelling interests in bureaucratic
convenience, efficiency, and preventing hypothetical fraud must
be subordinated to the constitutional interest in protecting free
exercise. The late pre-Smith cases and, of course, Smith itself
upset this balance, but RFRA restores the Sherbert standard. I
am tempted to say that, like Lee and Goldman, Bowen v. Roy is
therefore no longer good law under RFRA, except that I am not
sure what Bowen v. Roy actually decided. The justices divided
badly, and confusingly, over the proper disposition of the case.
The confusion was created by the district court's discovery, midtrial, that the government had already gone ahead and assigned
Little Bird of the Snow a social security number. This altered
the legal theory of the case significantly. According to my head
count, a clear majority held that the Roys had no right to keep
the government from making use of a social security number
already in its possession. Chief Justice Burger's opinion compared this to a religious claim seeking to enjoin the government
from using green filing cabinets on the ground that it would "rob
the spirit" of the religious claimant.0 ° In doctrinal jargon, the
Court held that the government imposed no cognizable "burden"
on the Roys' free exercise of religion, because it did not place any
compulsion on them to do (or refrain from doing) anything forbidden (or required) by their religious beliefs. At the same time,
an unclear majority of justices either held or would have held
(had they not thought the issue moot or unripe), that the First

100. Roy, 476 U.S. at 700 ("The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures.").
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Amendment protected the Roys from being themselves compelled
to obtain a social security number for their daughter, as a condition of eligibility for AFDC benefit.' ° '
RFRA might well preserve the first holding of Roy, on the
theory that there was no "substantial burden" on the Roys' religious exercise by virtue of the Government's use of a social security number the Roys were not themselves compelled to obtain
and provide. My point is limited to the proposition that, assuming that the Government would not have had the social security
number had the Roys not affirmatively obtained and provided
one, the Government plainly would not have had a compelling
interest in this particular administrative requirement, sufficient
to justify forcing the Roys to obtain a social security number for
Little Bird of the Snow.
In sum, the pattern of the Justice Department's argumentation in several pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause cases in the
1980s was to use slippery-slope arguments, unsubstantiated
fears, and ordinary concerns of administrative convenience to
assert "compelling interests." RFRA, by virtue of its incorporation-by-reference of the compelling interest test "as set forth in
Sherbert," repudiates these arguments.0 2
The now-withdrawn Justice Department brief in intervention in Christiansv. Crystal Evangelical was not as openly violative of this third modest point about the meaning of "compelling
interest" as it was of the first two. In tone, however, this was its
worst offense. The manifest tenor of the brief was that we cannot
allow exceptions to government-created rules on religious
grounds, because that would make those rules more difficult to
administer and would open up the possibility of more and more,
and some potentially spurious, religious claims for exemption.

101. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Here
is my head-count for this proposition: O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, joined by Brennan and Marshall, explicitly reached this conclusion. Roy, 476
U.S. at 726-32. Justice White's cryptic one-sentence dissent expressed the view that
"this case" was controlled by Thomas and Sherbert, apparently agreeing that the
government could not require the Roys to obtain and provide a social security number to the government as a condition of AFDC benefits. Id. at 733. Justice
Blackmun's opinion, concurring in part, is the reason for my doubt. Blackmun
thought a remand appropriate on the compelled-provision-of-the-number issue but
made clear his view that the Roys should win, and his hope that the government,
"ina welcome display of reasonableness, will decide that since it already has a social
security number for Little Bird of the Snow, it will not insist that [the Roys] resupply it." Id. at 714-15.
102.
Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b)(1), 107 Stat. at 1488; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1)
(Supp. V 1993).
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The one feature of the brief that contributed most to this aura
was its repeated citation of, and argument by analogy to, Caplin
& Drysdale, Chartered v.United States, the drug-lawyer assetforfeiture case." 3 The whispered message is loud, for all who
have ears to hear:
Grant these religious people their claim to exemption and others will come, giving away all their money to keep it from
creditors, feigning religious motivation, and making a mockery
of our sacred bankruptcy regime; and we won't have any way to
stop them. Let churches keep such donations and you are doing
the equivalent of letting drug lawyers keep the exorbitant fees
paid them by drug kingpins out of the proceeds of their illegal
transactions. The churches, like the drug lawyers, know all too
well what's going on-that the gift/fee is not legitimately given-yet stand all too willing to profit from it.
This is Professor Lupu's "spectral march." °4 President Clinton,
at least this one time, has called the march to a halt. But the
appeal of the argument, and its capacity to mislead, is enormous.
It is, therefore, important to recognize that RFRA rules such
arguments out of bounds. Efficiency, convenience, unproved
fears, and slippery-slope scenarios, do not constitute "compelling
interests" that override religious liberty under RFRA.
IV. DOES RFRA INCORPORATE-BY-REFERENCE THE COURT'S PRESMITH FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE? A RESPONSE TO SOME
OBVIOUS OBJECTIONS

My three seemingly modest points about the meaning of
"compelling governmental interest" under RFRA all flow from
the logic of RFRA's enactment and its statutory purpose, its
character as a "super-statute" expressly superseding previous
federal law (section 6(a)), and the logical implications of the
provision authorizing Congress hereafter to exempt federal law
from RFRA only by express terms (section 6(b)). The logic, structure, and express provisions of RFRA must (I have argued)
mean: (1) that policy interests not consistently or rigorously
pursued in analogous circumstances are not "compelling" as
against a claim for religious exemption; (2) that an interest is
not "compelling" just because the Justice Department says it is,
or merely because it is embodied in a federal statute or regula103. 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (cited in Brief for Intervenor at 13, 26, 33-35, Crystal
Evangelical, (No. 93-2667)(withdrawn)). See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
104. Lupu, supra note 1, at 947.
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tion; and (3) that institutional government's interests in administrative convenience, efficiency, or avoidance of the costs involved
in fairly handling claims for religious exemption are not "compelling" within the meaning of RFRA. Under RFRA, I submit, the
late pre-Smith "compelling interest" cases-cases that frequently
contradicted one or more of these principles-are simply no longer good law. So far as RFRA is concerned, it is as if Lee,
Goldman, Roy, and Hernandez were never decided. The slate has
been wiped clean (except, of course, for Sherbert and Yoder).
My interpretive approach is probably best characterized as
one of "structural statutory interpretation." I believe that this is
simply a species of textual interpretation. As such, I submit that
these necessary logical inferences from the words, structure, and
logic of the text, if sound on their own terms, cannot be defeated
by parol evidence of contrary legislative intent (on the part of at
least some legislators) placed in the legislative history of RFRA
but not embodied in RFRA itself."5 Thus, if my arguments concerning the minimal meaning of RFRA are sound, RFRA has
worked a radical change in the law of free exercise exemptions,
far beyond merely "restoring" pre-Smith case law, and it has
done so regardless of whether Congress (or some members of
Congress) subjectively intended this result. Even if Congress
intended RFRA as a trickle, it has created a torrent.
It is unclear, of course, exactly what Congress "intended,"

105. See Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv.
417, 419 (1899) ("We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what
the statute means."). For a fuller defense of this methodology, see Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 795, 838-841 (1993). It is true
that the meaning of a statute's words is often intelligible only when one understands
the context in and background against which those words were written. This is especially true where a statute employs a legal term of art. But if, as here, the meaning
of that legal term of art ("compelling governmental interest") is fixed by a reference
point specified in the text of the statute itself ("as set forth in Sherbert . . . and
Yoder"), the legislative history cannot specify a contrary reference point without contradicting the text of the statute. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1341-42 (7th Cir.
1989).
For opinions arguing that legislative history should play a limited role in statutory interpretation, see, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404-05 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99 (1991);
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989)(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-54
(1987)(Scalia, J., dissenting); Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (3 How.) (1845);
Davel v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 559, 562 (7th Cir. 1990); Overseas Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v.
Federal Labor Relations Auth., 876 F.2d 960, 974-75 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Buckley, J.,
concurring); Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985)(Scalia, J., concurring).
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but, contrary to my thesis, a colorable argument can be made
that RFRA implicitly incorporates cases like Lee, Hernandez, and
Goldman (and others as well) by reference, so that "compelling
interest" is operationally defined as including those interests
recognized as sufficient to defeat Free Exercise Clause claims
under late pre-Smith case law. First, RFRA is styled as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Second, the statute's "findings"
subsection recites Congress' view that "the compelling interest
test as set forth in priorFederal court rulings is a workable test
for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests" 1°-a phrase that seems to
counsel against a "sweeping" reading of RFRA. Finally, the legislative history often speaks of "restoring" the state of the law
prior to Employment Division v. Smith. Particularly troubling is
language contained in both the Senate and House committee
reports on RFRA. Consider the House's version:
It is the Committee's expectation that the courts will look
to free exercise of religion cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether or not religious exercise has been
burdened and the least restrictive means have been employed
in furthering a compelling governmental interest. Furthermore,
by enacting this legislation, the Committee neither approves
nor disapproves of the result in any particular court decision
involving the free exercise of religion, including those cited in
this bill. This bill is not a codification of any prior free exercise
decision but rather the restoration of the legal standard that
was applied in those decisions. Therefore, the compelling governmental interest test should be applied to all cases where the
exercise of religion is substantially burdened; however, the test
generally should not be construed more stringently or more
leniently than it was prior to Smith."°7
106.

Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(a)(5), 107 Stat. at 1488; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5)

(Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
107. H.R. REP. No. 103-88, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993). The Senate Report
language is substantially the same:
The committee wishes to stress that the act does not express approval or
disapproval of the result reached in any particular court decision involving

the free exercise of religion, including those cited in the act itself. This bill
is not a codification of the result reached in any prior free exercise decision
but rather the restoration of the legal standard that was applied in those
decisions. Therefore, the compelling interest test generally should not be
construed more stringently or more leniently than it was prior to Smith.
S. REP. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1993).
The "Additional Views" of some members of the House Judiciary Committee
reflect the understanding of those members that RFRA did not reflect "the high
water mark as found in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, but merely re-
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Taken together, this evidence makes an apparent (though, I
shall argue, ultimately unpersuasive) case for incorporation-byreference of the late pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause decisions.
One could, accepting these arguments, understand RFRA as
returning to the status quo ante just prior to Smith. It can reasonably be anticipated that state and federal governments eventually will argue that RFRA should be so understood. Moreover,
given judicial acceptance of the watering-down of "compelling
interest" in constitutional free exercise decisions in the decade
prior to Smith, it can reasonably be anticipated that courts will
not be unsympathetic to such arguments.
The better answer, however, is that none of these arguments, alone or in combination, suffice to defeat my arguments
that RFRA demands a more Sherbert-like interpretation of "compelling interest." To begin with, the counter-argument from the
use of the word "restoration" in RFRA's title is a non-starter.
Congress often blesses its acts with flowery titles that may or
may not bear much relationship to the substance of the statute
itself. The terms of an act are what count, not its title.' °8 Moreover, given RFRA's restoration of the compelling interest standard to categories of cases where Smith abandoned it, the statute plainly is a "restoration" Act. One need not restore prior law,
jot and tittle, in order to be restoring something.
The "findings" clause argument fares little better. That provision states that the compelling interest test "as set forth in
prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances." This language does not mean that Congress embraced the results in all pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause rulings
of the Supreme Court and other federal courts. Rather, Congress
embraced the test as a good one capable of producing sound and
sensible results. The "findings" clause therefore does not, by
itself, affirmatively validate any given application of the test,
such as Lee.
Moreover, RFRA's "purposes" clause, which immediately
follows the "findings" clause, specifically embraces Sherbert and
Yoder. The "Federal court rulings" to which the "findings" clause
refers as striking a sensible balance could well mean the test as

turns the law to the state as it existed prior to Smith." H.R. 103-88, at 15 (Additional Views of Hon. Henry J. Hyde et al.).
108. See generally Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.,
331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947).
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announced and applied in Sherbert and Yoder. (I will discuss the
legislative history's attempted semi-denial of the results in
Sherbert and Yoder presently.) On the hypothesis that the "findings" are in tension with the "purpose," a good argument can be
made that purpose should control. "Findings" concern what Congress believes has happened in the past and is the current state
of affairs, as a matter of fact. "Purposes" concern what Congress
understood itself to be doing in the Act's substantive provisions.
Therefore, to the degree that either the "purposes" or "findings"
clause indicates congressional approval of applications of the
compelling interest test (rather than mere approval of the test
itself), the "purposes" clause, which embraces Sherbert and
Yoder, should control.'" In any event, the "findings" clause reference surely is not sufficient to incorporate by reference the
applications of the compelling interest test in cases like Lee,
Goldman, and Hernandez. °
The legislative history is a thornier issue. Putting to one
side the question of whether legislative history should ever be
relevant to statutory interpretation,' the legislative history of
RFRA on this point has the feel of one of those delicately-crafted
cloakroom compromises that allows both sides to argue that its
understanding of the statute is the correct one, but that does not
actually aid in objective interpretation of the statute's terms.
Certain points are reasonably clear, however. First, the legislative history seems clearly to reinforce the conclusion that RFRA
does not incorporate the late pre-Smith cases. The committee
reports state that RFRA "is not a codification of any prior free
exercise decision." ' Thus, Lee, Hernandez, and Goldman are
109. Accord Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive
Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (1994).
110. Professor Lupu notes that an earlier version of RFRA contained nearly
identical references to Sherbert and Yoder in both the findings and the purposes provisions, and speculates as to the meaning of the change from explicit case reference
to the more generic "prior federal court rulings" in the findings section. Professor
Lupu suggests that this change renders RFRA "internally inconsistent." Lupu, supra
note 10, at 196. For the reasons noted in the text, I am not at all sure that there is
any inconsistency at all. In any event, Professor Lupu and I agree that, to the extent there is inconsistency, the purposes provision prevails over the findings provision. Lupu, supra note 10, at 196-97.
111.
See supra note 105.
112.
S. REP. No. 103-111, supra note 107, at 9 ("The committee wishes to stress
that the act does not express approval or disapproval of the result reached in any
particular court decision involving the free exercise of religion, including those cited
in the act itself."); H.R. REP. No. 103-88, supra note 107, at 7 ("[B]y enacting this
legislation, the Committee neither approves nor disapproves of the result in any
particular court decision involving the free exercise of religion, including those cited
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not "controlling" precedents governing RFRA's interpretation.
At the same time, however, the legislative history seemingly
backs the authority of these cases when it states that the committees "expect[ed]" that courts will "look to" these prior cases.
This mushy language is not very helpful. Courts can "look" all
they want, but the committee reports do not tell courts what
they should find in prior cases that controls RFRA's interpretation, other than the compelling interest standard itself."3
Even more troubling, the Senate report states that because
RFRA does not codify prior decisions applying the compelling
interest test, "[tiherefore the compelling interest test generally
should not be construed more stringently or more leniently than
it was prior to Smith.""" On its face, this last statement would
seem the strongest argument against my position that RFRA
requires a Sherbert-like application of "compelling interest." But
the "[tiherefore" is totally illogical, and takes all the sting out of

in this bill. This bill is not a codification of any prior free exercise decision but rather the restoration of the legal standard that was applied in those decisions.").
113.
The case for reliance on legislative history would seem strongest when used
to translate the meaning of a statutory term-of-art, like "compelling governmental
interest." But the way in which one would expect the legislative history to provide
clarification would be in noting that the term had its origins in Supreme Court cases
and in specifying which cases define its proper application. The legislative history
does the former, but specifically abjures any attempt to do the latter. The consequence is that the legislative history provides no meaningful assistance in interpreting the text of the statute, which does a far better job of specifying congressional
intent by specifically stating that among the purposes of the Act is to restore the
compelling governmental interest test "as set forth in" Sherbert and Yoder.
One further theoretical possibility is that Congress intended to leave the
meaning of "compelling state interest" vague and to leave it to the courts to develop,
on a common law basis, the meaning of RFRA over time. Professor Lupu's article
takes something like this view, arguing that the interpretation of RFRA's section 3
must of necessity be "dynamic." Lupu, supra note 10, at 224. The problem with this
view (as with all theories of "dynamic" textual interpretation) is that it confuses the
meaning of a legal standard with the sometimes shifting pattern of decisions applying that standard. It is doubtless true that different courts, at different times, will
find different things to be "compelling" governmental interests. But that does not
mean that all such decisions are correct and that Congress intended the standard
itself to shift. Some of the decisions interpreting RFRA will be sound applications of
the compelling interest standard and some will be unsound applications of that standard. There is no evidence that Congress intended the legal meaning of "compelling
governmental interest" to be dynamic in the sense that the standard might no longer
be the one "set forth in Sherbert . . . and Yoder."
114.
S. REP. No. 103-111, supra note 107, at 9 (emphasis added). The House
Report is to similar effect. After noting that RFRA does not codify prior decisions,
the House report states that "[tiherefore, the compelling governmental interest test
should be applied to all cases where the exercise of religion is substantially burdened; however, the test generally should not be construed more stringently or more
leniently than it was prior to Smith." H.R. REP. No. 103-88, supra, note 107, at 7.
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the neither-more-stringently-nor-more-leniently phrase. It does
not at all follow from agnosticism about the correctness of the
results in prior cases that courts should ("generally") construe
the test no more or less stringently than it was construed in
those cases. What follows from agnosticism about Lee, Goldman,
Hernandez, et al. and Congress' deliberate refusal to codify results is that courts should view those issues (and analogous
cases) afresh; whether the resulting pattern of decisions is more
stringent or more lenient than the pre-Smith pattern of decisions
logically should be up for grabs.
Thus, the seemingly most relevant legislative history is
internally inconsistent (not to mention fudged by the weaselword "generally"). The prior cases are, as nearly all will admit,
contradictory. It is difficult, for example, to square Lee with
Yoder in any principled way. While the evidence is that Congress
did not wish to get mired down in arguing the merits of each
particular case, there is no evidence that they deliberately intended to embrace contradiction. Rather, the evidence is that
they consciously chose not to validate the state of free exercise
law as it existed the day before Smith was decided but instead to
embrace the Sherbert-Yoder test without simultaneously validating all of that test's (mis-)applications by the courts. The better
reading of the legislative history is thus one that is consistent
with the statutory text: that Congress was agnostic about prior
outcomes. The better inference from agnosticism is a clean slate.
A court writing on a clean slate might end up reaching outcomes
similar to those produced by the Court's attempts to apply
Sherbert and Yoder to subsequent cases, but similar outcomes
are not required even by the legislative history, and still less by
RFRA itself. In short, the legislative history does not clearly
contradict the conclusions I have drawn from the statute's structure and language. At best, the legislative history supports my
conclusions; at worst, the legislative history is more ambiguous
than the statute.
I cannot resist one final point about the committee reports'
studied ambiguity concerning the question of incorporation-byreference. Both reports, in their fervor to deny that RFRA embraces the results in particular cases, say that this "include[s]
those [cases] cited in this bill"-meaning, of course, Sherbert and
Yoder.115 Sherbert and Yoder, however, necessarily remain good

115.
S. REP. No. 103-111, supra note 107, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 103-88, supra
note 107, at 7.
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law as a matter of the Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, even after Smith. The results in Sherbert and Yoder mark
the Supreme Court's understanding of the constitutional floor beneath which any congressional elaboration of free exercise rights
may not sink. Congress could not overrule that minimum if it
wanted to. To feign agnosticism about the outcome in those cases
seems a tad disingenuous, since Sherbert and Yoder provide the
baseline constitutional standard that Congress was purporting to
extend by statute to cases where Smith had abandoned it. It
would make a complete hash out of the structure of the statute
to say that RFRA adopts a statutory standard that might produce results less protective of religious liberty than the Constitution requires. Yet, if RFRA restores the late pre-Smith approach,
Mrs. Sherbert and the Old Order Amish almost surely do not
prevail in their RFRA claims against state governments. It is
possible, I suppose, that Congress intended that there would be
some situations where a religious claimant would lose under
RFRA but win under the Free Exercise Clause, but that is
scarcely a natural reading of either the statute or its legislative
history. The manifest tenor of the statute and the legislative
debate is that RFRA extends Sherbert and Yoder, not that it
creates a statutory right "smaller" than Sherbert, but applicable
to a broader class of cases." 6

116. The case of Board of Education of the Westside Community School v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) provides an interesting comparison. Mergens involved
questions of interpretation of the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (adopted in
1984), which mandates that public secondary schools that allow some "noncurriculum
related" student clubs to meet during noninstructional time must allow religious and
political groups equal access. The school district resisting application of the Equal
Access Act urged an interpretation of "noncurriculum related" that would essentially
allow it to determine which student groups were allowed access and which were not,
as a function of the district's power to control its own curriculum. As with RFRA's
term "compelling government interest," the Equal Access Act's critical term
.noncurriculum related" was not defined. As with RFRA, the Equal Access Act was
an attempt to transform imprecise Supreme Court doctrine into statutory terms. See
generally Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1 (1993). As with RFRA, the Equal Access Act's legislative history could be
read to find support for virtually any imaginable interpretation of the undefined legal
term-of-art.
The Court in Mergens, faced with this situation, relied on the legislative history as relevant only at the general level of indicating a broad legislative purpose to
remedy the perceived problem of discrimination against student religious groups at
public secondary schools, noted the overwhelming majorities by which the Equal
Access Act passed, and noted that acceptance of the school district's interpretation
would render the act essentially "hortatory," and allow school districts to opt out of
the nondiscrimination requirement simply by definitional fiat. Mergens, 496 U.S. at
238-45. So too with RFRA: RFRA was passed by overwhelming majorities of both

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/11

42

19951

Paulsen: A RFRA Runs Through It

A RFRA RUNS THROUGH IT

The awkward denial of Sherbert and Yoder seems to verify
that the committee report language is the product of an interestgroup wrestling match for superior position to place a particular
spin on the statute itself. The result is incoherence, not elucidation. It would be going too far to say that RFRA is one of those
clear statutes that the legislative history cannot make clearer,
for RFRA is not crystal clear. But it is fair to say that the ambiguities of RFRA 'are ones that are most sensibly resolved by
looking to the internal structure, logic and language of the statute itself; and that RFRA is one of those moderately ambiguous
statutes that resort to legislative history would only make more
ambiguous.
V.

CONCLUSION

As this article goes to press, the Eighth Circuit has yet to
decide the Crystal Evangelical case. The Justice Department has
withdrawn its brief, but it is unclear what, if anything, this
portends for future positions of the Government in litigation over
RFRA claims. I began with a jeremiad against institutional
Government's seemingly irrepressible hostility to free exercise
exemption claims. I would like to end with a proposed solution.
Part of the problem with the Justice Department's approach
to issues of free exercise accommodation is that, viewed in the
context of any one particular case, the religious claimant seems,
from institutional Government's perspective, to be a crank (or a
Trojan Horse hiding cranks to be let loose in the night). Moreover, the Government's interest in preserving the integrity of its
programs seems in any given case, so obvious, reasonable, and
sensible as not to be subject to question (or at least so it seems
to the Government). The root of the problem lies in the episodic,
case-by-case context in which the Justice Department's free exercise jurisprudence evolves, and the natural inclination to want to
do its federal agency clients' bidding. Every agency has its pet
federal statutes that it administers regularly and has come to

houses and reflected a broad purpose of protection of religious liberty from government burdens; though the term "compelling governmental interest" is not defined, the
legislative history is even more ambiguous; most importantly, an interpretation of
"compelling governmental interest" that would permit the Government to define its
way out of the requirements of RFRA or that did not provide at least the rigor of
Sherbert and Verner would seemingly be at odds with the broad remedial purposes of
RFRA. Congress and the President plainly understood themselves to be doing something significant with RFRA. Mergens holds that such an understanding counsels
strongly against any narrowing interpretation of the statute's protections.
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know and love. RFRA has, at present, no comparable institutional bureaucratic constituency.
The solution is to designate such a constituency, charge it
with the responsibility of developing interpretive regulations for
applying RFRA to other federal laws, and empower it to preempt any contrary interpretation advanced by any other agency
within the federal government. These regulations would then be
binding on the Department's litigating divisions, preempting up
front the temptation to sacrifice RFRA in favor of other federal
statutes.
The best place to vest such power is probably the Civil
Rights Division of the Justice Department. It is probably no
coincidence that the Department's atrocious brief in Crystal
Evangelical was prepared by lawyers in the Civil Division, which
regularly defends lawsuits challenging government programs,
and not by lawyers in the Civil Rights Division, which regularly
brings lawsuits against private parties to enforce federal statutes
protecting individual rights. If RFRA is to be interpreted in a
more rights-protective manner, the Civil Rights Division should
be given litigating jurisdiction over these matters within the
Department of Justice, including the authority to overrule the
position of the Civil Division and its client agencies." 7
Executive branch interpretive regulations would be entitled
to Chevron deference from the courts."' Presumably, however,
the occasions for such judicial deference would be few. Weak
assertions of compelling interest would not even be presented in
cases involving the federal government, as Government agencies
fall into line with a unified executive branch interpretation of
RFRA. Still, interpretive regulations narrowing the range of
permissible federal government assertions of "compelling" interest under RFRA would help the courts, in two distinct ways.
First, courts would not be tempted (or misled) to follow the late
pre-Smith cases, at least not with the same frequency. The Justice Department's briefs carry weight, and it is clear that the

117. Assigning RFRA matters to the Civil Rights Division will not entirely eliminate the conflict between RFRA and other government programs. For example, RFRA
free exercise claims may well come into conflict with federal civil rights statutes. Cf
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Nonetheless, Civil Rights
Division enforcement would at least provide a government office systematically committed to enforcement of RFRA, and there is a better chance that RFRA claims will
be taken seriously (even as against other civil rights statutes) if it is placed within
the jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Division than if it is left without an institutional
"home."
118. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Department's systematic assault on Sherbert in the 1980s was a
significant influence in the Court's decision to abandon that
standard in Smith. Similarly, the Justice Department's interpretation of RFRA will carry weight. This suggests the second value
of such regulations. The Department's interpretive regulations
could of course apply to cases involving RFRA's application to
the states as well. The Department of Justice Civil Rights Division should intervene in RFRA cases brought against state governments in order both to defend the constitutionality of RFRA
(the Section 5 power issue noted above)" 9 and to advance a rigorous application of the compelling interest standard, in order to
accomplish RFRA's purpose of protecting religious liberty. Absent
a prior commitment to these values, the Justice Department can
almost certainly be expected to roll over and play dead in cases
challenging state laws under RFRA. The federal government's
institutional interest in a weak RFRA, as applied to federal programs, would lead it to acquiesce in a weakening of RFRA as
against state bureaucracies, too. That way, more federal programs can avoid the inconvenience of complying with RFRA.
It may be too much to hope that the Department of Justice
will learn from the Crystal Evangelical debacle and re-interpret
RFRA. Given President Clinton's extraordinary action in ordering the withdrawal of the Department's brief, however, it may
not be too much to hope that the White House will reassign
authority over RFRA matters within the Department and ask
the Civil Rights Division to develop interpretive regulations
binding on the federal government and guiding the Department's
RFRA interpretations in cases challenging state laws, too.
This is not a prediction. Nor are any of my modest proposals
for construing "compelling interest" predictions of what courts
will hold. If I were a betting man (and I am)'2 ° , I would wager
that the courts will apply RFRA pretty much the way they applied the Sherbert test prior to Smith: inconsistently, insensitively, and incoherently. Government will win, nearly all of the time,
and nearly everything that Government asserts to be a "compelling" interest will be recognized as such by the courts. The
yanked Crystal Evangelical brief will not be wasted work for the

119.
See supra note 10.
120. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra, note 105, at 796. On the closing day of the symposium, I publicly wagered a case of beer against any takers that the Supreme Court
would not hold (in the first case squarely presenting and deciding the issue) RFRA
unconstitutional as applied to the states, on the ground of lack of congressional power to enact it. Professor Lupu, always a sucker, accepted the bet. We'll see.
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Department of Justice's lawyers, but will be recycled and reused, in varying forms, in future cases. The Department will
offer a tepid defense of RFRA's constitutionality as applied to
states.
Such a result would be tragic-like the end of a Norman
Maclean short story. RFRA is a beautiful legislative accomplishment in the terrain of religious liberty. It is a self-denial of federal legislative power to burden religion, where the Supreme Court
has permitted such burdens. It is an assertion of federal legislative power to prevent state governments from burdening religion,
where the Supreme Court has permitted such burdens. But
amidst all this beauty, there is the haunting presence of the Free
Exercise jurisprudence of the past.
Eventually, all these issues merge in the U.S. Code. And a
RFRA runs through it.
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